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Abstract
We study the role of youth’s subjective expectations about their own ability in shaping
school choices in secondary education. A field experiment that provides ninth-graders in urban
Mexico with individualized feedback about their academic skills generates exogenous variation
in beliefs that is used to isolate their role in driving students’ allocation across high schools.
We find that mean beliefs increase the value of attending academically-oriented schools, while
students with greater dispersion in their beliefs find this curricular track less attractive. These
results are in line with the heterogeneous treatment impacts on school choices, since the feed-
back spurs differential changes in the location of beliefs and overall large variance reductions
that either reinforce or counteract the effect of changes in the first moment. The information
intervention induces a steeper gradient of the relationship between academic achievement and
the demand for academic schools. This reallocation of skills across tracks improves the match
between students and schools, as measured by the rate of high-school graduation on time.
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1 Introduction
Most of our choices are made under uncertainty and rely on subjective expectations about present
and future returns. Investments in human capital crucially hinge on these expectations as they are
typically made very early in the life-cycle and often impose high switching costs. For instance,
academically-oriented secondary schools are well-equipped to prepare students for college but pro-
vide limited skills and training for those who choose not to continue their education or those who
opt for technical/vocational higher education careers. Even under complete information about the
characteristics and the labor market returns of alternative schooling trajectories, biased mispercep-
tions about own talent and skills may lead to misallocation insofar as students end up choosing
alternatives with high average returns but low individual-specific returns.
This paper studies the role of youth’s subjective expectations about their own ability in shaping
school choices in secondary education and how these choices affect subsequent schooling trajec-
tories. This specific source of subjective uncertainty has been largely overlooked in the recent
literature on information provision and schooling decisions.1 We design and implement a field
experiment that provides students with individualized feedback on their academic skills during
the transition from middle to high school. The context of the study is a centralized assignment
mechanism that allocates students across high school programs in Mexico City according to ap-
plicants’ school rankings and performance on an achievement test. Since students submit their
school choices before taking the admission exam, they rely on perceptions about their own aca-
demic skills when making high-stakes decisions about future academic trajectories. We administer
a mock version of the admission test, communicate individual scores to a randomly chosen sub-
set of applicants, and elicit probabilistic statements about performance beliefs in the admission test
using bean counts. The research design also includes a pure control group of applicants who do not
take the mock test, allowing us to distinguish between the effects of taking the test and receiving
performance feedback. In this setting, the score in the mock exam provides students with a signal
about their own academic potential that is easy to interpret and contains relevant information on
individual-specific returns across schooling careers.
Data from the control group show that there are large discrepancies between perceived and
measured performance in the test, especially among students with low exam scores who tend to
hold upwardly biased beliefs about their own academic achievement. Results from the experiment
show that providing feedback on individual performance substantially shifts the location of the
1Several studies have studied the role of information about labor market outcomes, school quality, or financial aid
and application procedures on schooling decisions. A few recent contributions include Hastings and Weinstein [2008];
Jensen [2010]; Carrell and Sacerdote [2013]; Mizala and Urquiola [2013]; Hoxby and Turner [2014]; Dinkelman and
Martinez [2014]; Wiswall and Zafar [2015a]; Hastings et al. [2015]; Bleemer and Zafar [2018]; Dustan [2018].
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individual belief distributions while reducing the dispersion, whereas taking the test only increases
the dispersion. The provision of performance feedback also generates a steeper gradient of the
relationship between the demand for academically-oriented schools and the score in the mock test,
with better performing (lower performing) students increasing (decreasing) the share of academic
options in their school rankings. This choice response alters the realized skill composition across
high-school tracks in our sample. Unique follow-up administrative data further enable us to track
the medium-run consequences of the change in the sorting patterns by ability triggered by the in-
tervention. Three years after school assignment, the probability of graduating from high school on
time is on average 8 percentage points higher among students who received performance feedback,
which corresponds to a 15-percent increase relative to the control group.
We next propose and estimate a school choice model that incorporates the role of students’ be-
liefs about their performance in the test as a proxy for their perceptions about own academic ability.
Crucially, we allow for both the mean and the dispersion of the individual belief distributions to
shape the heterogeneous preferences over school characteristics. The experimental variation in be-
liefs induced by the information intervention is introduced in the model through a simple two-step
control function approach. We find that ignoring the endogeneity of subjective beliefs in the school
choice model greatly underplays their role in driving the observed sorting patterns across schools,
especially for the second moment of the belief distributions. Mean beliefs about test performance
have positive effects on the value of attending an academically-oriented school. Conditional on
the mean, students who are more uncertain about their performance in the test find it less attractive
to attend academically-oriented schools. The relatively large magnitudes and the opposing signs
of the estimated preference parameters for the two moments of the belief distributions may poten-
tially explain the pattern of heterogeneity of the treatment effects on track choices along the test
score distribution as well as the associated medium-run impacts on high-school trajectories.
In order to quantitatively illustrate this mechanism, we simulate the school choice model at
estimated parameters using the longitudinal variation in beliefs for students in the treatment group
and compare the predicted choice probabilities before and after the delivery of performance feed-
back. Students with higher test scores are likely to update their beliefs upwards in response to
performance feedback, thereby strengthening the positive effect of the associated decrease in the
dispersion of beliefs. Among students who instead update downwards after receiving performance
feedback, the reduction in the dispersion counteracts the negative effect of changes in the mean of
beliefs. These two effects offset each other among students with test scores around the mean of the
distribution, completely undoing the impact of performance feedback on choices, whereas the neg-
ative effect of changes in the mean of the belief distributions dominates for students at the bottom
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of the score distribution. The estimated model further allows us to decompose the relative impor-
tance of exam taking when compared to performance feedback on track choices. While the net
effect of personalized performance feedback can get diluted due to the interplay between simulta-
neous changes in the mean and the dispersion of the subjective ability distributions, uninformative
signals, that exclusively increase the noise in beliefs, may have a more direct pass-through into
choices and outcomes. Indeed, we show that among worse-performing students, the negative ef-
fect of exam taking on the demand for academic schools is comparable in magnitude to the impact
of performance feedback in spite of much larger changes in beliefs triggered by the more accurate
ability signal.
The study of individual choices under uncertainty traditionally relied on revealed preferences
in order to estimate demand-side parameters. However, preferences and expectations cannot be
recovered from choice data alone, since observed choices may be consistent with different config-
urations of the constructs of interest [Manski, 2002; Magnac and Thesmar, 2002]. Our paper fits
within a broad and long standing body of work addressing this under-identification problem by di-
rectly measuring subjective expectations and using them in conjunction with choice data. Several
studies along these lines have focused on measures of beliefs related to the labor market returns
of human capital investments,2 but relatively fewer studies have explored the role of perceived
individual traits. Altonji [1993] and Arcidiacono [2004] introduce the notion of uncertainty about
ability into the probability of completing a college major and more recent work documents the
role of beliefs about future performance on college major choices and dropout decisions [Arcidia-
cono et al., 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014; Arcidiacono et al., 2016]. Notably,
Kapor et al. [2018] measure the role of biased beliefs about admission chances on school choices.
Few papers in the literature have explicitly acknowledged the possibility that elicited mea-
sures of subjective beliefs may be jointly determined with choices and outcomes [Lochner, 2007;
Bellemare et al., 2008; De-Paula et al., 2014; Delavande and Kohler, 2015]. One promising strat-
egy, recently explored by Delavande and Zafar [forthcoming], attempts to identify the relationship
between beliefs and choices by directly measuring beliefs and expected outcomes under counter-
factual states. Our work follows the approach in Wiswall and Zafar [2015a], which relies on an
information experiment to estimate a model of college major choice that incorporates the role of
beliefs about own ability along with a variety of forecasts about future events. We build on this
line of work by more narrowly focusing on the role perceptions about own ability and eliciting
2Kaufmann [2014]; Attanasio and Kaufmann [2014]; Wiswall and Zafar [2015b] measure perceived education
returns (as well as perceived earnings risk and perceived unemployment risk in some cases). Giustinelli [2016] studies
how subjective expected utilities of both parents and students shape high school track choices. Hastings et al. [2016]
evaluate the role of earnings and cost expectations on degree choice and dropout in college. More recently, Delavande
and Zafar [forthcoming] circumvent identification issues, relying on beliefs and outcome data for counterfactual states.
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subjective expectations in a context where beliefs are tightly linked to concrete, immediate, and
high-stakes choices. The longitudinal span of our data allows us to go further and assess the longer-
term impacts of feedback provision on schooling outcomes. The methodological approach pursued
here also shares with a few recent papers the idea of leveraging external sources of variations in-
duced by field experiments in order to credibly identify and estimate empirical choice models that,
in turn, are used to unpack the mechanisms through which the experimental intervention affects
behaviors [Attanasio et al., 2012; Galiani et al., 2015; Duflo et al., forthcoming].
This paper is also related to a recent strand of the economics of education literature that uses
natural or field experiments to uncover the mechanisms through which feedback on students’ aca-
demic ability affects schooling outcomes. Azmat and Iriberri [2010]; Azmat et al. [2018]; Elsner
and Stinebrickner [2017] consider the role of students’ ordinal rank on their effort and subsequent
performance. Andrabi et al. [2017] evaluate a bundled intervention that provides individual perfor-
mance information and average school performance to both households with school-age children
and schools. Bergman [2015] studies the role of information frictions between parents and their
children in the United States, while Dizon-Ross [2018] conducts a field experiment in Malawi in
which parents are provided with information about their children’s academic performance. Our
work uncovers and quantifies the role of a novel channel through which the provision of perfor-
mance feedback shapes school choices and subsequent trajectories: the interplay between simulta-
neous changes in both the mean and the dispersion of the individual distributions of beliefs about
own ability. It may thus help interpreting some of the findings in these studies that typically docu-
ment heterogenous responses of feedback provision by students and/or parents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the context of the feed-
back provision experiment, the different sources of data that we have collected, and the research
design. Section 3 presents the reduced-form impacts of the intervention on beliefs, school choices,
and longer-term schooling outcomes. In Section 4 we develop the empirical school choice model,
discuss identification and estimation issues, and present the resulting estimates of the preference
parameters. Using the estimated model, Section 5 reports simulation results that shed light on
some of the channels through which the information intervention had an effect on school choices
while Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Feedback Provision Experiment
2.1 Context
Since 1996, a local commission (COMIPEMS, by its Spanish acronym) has administered pub-
lic high school admissions in Mexico City’s metropolitan area through a centralized assignment
mechanism. In 2014, over 238,000 students were placed in 628 public high schools, accounting
for roughly three-quarters of enrollment in the area. The remaining 25 percent of high schools stu-
dents enrolled in either other public schools with open admission (10 percent) or private schools
(15 percent).
Students apply to the COMIPEMS system during the next to last term while in ninth grade –
i.e., the last year of middle school. Prior to registration, they receive a booklet outlining the timing
of the application process and corresponding instructions, as well as a list of available schools,
their basic characteristics, and cut-off scores in the last three rounds. In addition to the registration
form, students fill out a socio-demographic survey and a ranked list of, at most, 20 schools. At
the end of the school year, all applicants take a unique standardized achievement test.3 Based
on their scores, students are ranked in descending order and the matching algorithm goes down
the list to sequentially assign applicants to their most preferred schooling option with available
seats. Each placed applicant is matched with one school. Whenever ties occur, members of the
Commission agree on whether to admit all tied students or none of them. Unplaced applicants
can request admission in other schools with available seats after the allocation process is over or
search for a seat in schools with open admissions outside the system. Whenever applicants are
not satisfied with their placement, they can request admission to another school in the same way
unplaced applicants do. In sum, the assignment system discourages applicants to remain unplaced
and/or list schools they will ultimately not enroll in, as placement through the second round will
almost surely imply being placed in a school not included in the student’s original ranking. In
practice, the matching algorithm performs quite well: only 11% of the applicants in our sample
remain unplaced, and 2% are admitted through the second round of the matching process.
The Mexican system offers three educational tracks at the upper secondary level: General,
Technical, and Vocational Education. Each school within the assignment system offers a unique
track. The general track is academically oriented and includes traditional schools more focused
on preparing students for tertiary education. Technical schools cover most of the curriculum of
3The submission of school preferences before the application of the admission exam is an unusual feature of the
COMIPEMS system relative to other centralized assignment mechanisms based on priority indexes. The timing of the
events in the application process is meant to provide the system with a ballpark estimate of the number of seats that
should be provided through the matching process.
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general education programs, but they also provide additional courses allowing students to become
technicians upon completion of high school. The vocational track exclusively trains students to
become professional technicians. A set of 16 technical schools within the assignment system are
affiliated with a higher education institution (the National Polytechnic Institute, IPN by its Spanish
acronym). These are highly selective options and graduating cohorts usually enroll in tertiary
education programs sponsored by the IPN. In what follows, we group general track and IPN-
sponsored schools into an “academic” track while all remaining technical and vocational schools
are assigned to a “non-academic” track.
Data from a nationally representative survey of individuals aged 26-35 in urban Mexico (EN-
TELEMS, 2008) shows that attending the general track yields a positive premium of 12 percentage
points over the other tracks in terms of average hourly wages. However, these higher returns seem
to be driven by those who complete college, which is an uncertain event as only 60 percent of the
graduates from the general track do so.4 This explains the greater degree of dispersion in the wage
distribution among those who do not complete college: the ratio of the SD to the mean of hourly
wages is 1.37 among high-school graduates of the general track while it is only 0.84 among their
counterparts from technical and vocational schools.
2.2 Data and Measurement
Admission records from the 2014 assignment process allow us to observe school preference rank-
ings, admission exam scores, cumulative GPA in middle school, and placement outcomes. We
link these records to data from the registration form, which includes additional socio-demographic
variables such as gender, age, household assets, parental education and occupation, personality
traits, and study habits, among others. We also collected and harmonized additional administra-
tive records from each of the nine high-school institutions that cater to the centralized assignment
system for the academic years 2014-15 and 2016-17 – i.e., the first and last statutory year of high
school for the students who participate in the 2014 round of the school assignment mechanism.
These data allow us to measure enrollment and graduation on time from the upper secondary level
for the students in our sample.
We complement the administrative data with individual records from the application of a mock
version of the admission exam. The mock exam was designed by the same institution that prepares
the official admission exam in order to mirror the latter in terms of structure, content, level of
difficulty, and duration (three hours). The test is comprised of 128 multiple-choice questions worth
4In the non-academic track, less than 40 percent of the graduates from technical or vocational high schools finish
college.
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one point each, without negative marking.5 To reduce preparation biases due to unexpected testing
while minimizing absenteeism, we informed students about the application of the mock exam a
few days in advance but did not tell them the exact date of the event. In order to guarantee that the
mock test was taken seriously, we also informed parents and school principals about the benefits
of additional practice for the admission exam. We also made sure that the school principal sent
the person in charge of the academic discipline and/or a teacher to proctor the exam along with the
survey enumerators.6
We argue that the score in the mock exam was easy to interpret for the students in our sample
while providing additional and relevant information about their academic skills. The linear correla-
tion in our sample between performance in the mock exam and the actual exam is 0.82. Moreover,
this relationship does nor vary along the exam score distribution. In turn, the linear correlation
between a freely available signal such as the middle school GPA and the admission exam score
is only 0.48. Controlling for middle school GPA, the mock exam score also predicts success in
high school: a one SD increase in the mock exam score is associated with a 2.6 percentage-point
increase (std.err.=0.030) in the probability of graduating from high school on time.
We collect rich survey data with detailed information on the subjective distribution of beliefs
about performance in the admission exam. In order to help students understand probabilistic con-
cepts, the survey relied on visual aids [Delavande et al., 2011]. We explicitly linked the number of
beans placed in a cup to a probability measure, where zero beans means that the student assigns
zero probability to a given event and 20 beans means that the student believes the event will occur
with certainty. Students were provided with a card divided into six discrete intervals of the score.
Surveyors then elicited students’ expected performance in the test by asking them to allocate the
20 beans across the intervals so as to represent the chances of scoring in each bin.7 The survey
5Since the mock test took place before the end of the school year, 13 questions related to curriculum content that
was not yet covered were not graded. Out of eight questions in the History, Ethics, and Chemistry sections, four, three,
and six were excluded, respectively. We normalize the raw scores obtained in the 115 valid questions to correspond to
the 128-point scale before providing feedback.
6We further look at the pattern of skipped questions, as this seems to be the main driver of biases due to non-
serious behavior in multiple choice test taking [Akyol et al., 2018]. Without negative marking, the expected value
of guessing is always higher than leaving a question blank, which implies that students have no incentive to skip a
question. Indeed, the average number of skipped questions in our mock exam was only 1.4 out of 128, and more than
80 percent of the students did not leave any question unanswered. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that the skipping
behavior in the mock exam is more consistent with binding time constraints rather than lack of seriousness. In addition,
we do not find differential skipping patterns according to either the score in the admission exam or personality traits
related to effort and persistence.
7We include a set of practice questions before eliciting beliefs:
1. How sure are you that you are going to see one or more movies tomorrow?
2. How sure are you that you are going to see one or more movies in the next two weeks?
3. How sure are you that you are going to travel to Africa next month?
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question eliciting beliefs reads as follows (authors’ translation from Spanish):
“Suppose that you were to take the COMIPEMS exam today, which has a maximum
possible score of 128 and a minimum possible score of zero. How sure are you that
your score would be between ... and ...”
During the pilot activities, we tested different versions with less bins and/or fewer beans to
evaluate the trade-off between coarseness of the grid and students’ ability to distribute beans across
all intervals. We settled for six intervals with 20 beans as students were at ease with that format.
Only 6% of the respondents concentrate all beans in one interval, which suggests that the grid
was too coarse only for a few applicants. The resulting individual ability distributions seem well-
behaved: using the 20 observations (i.e., beans) per student, we run a normality test [Shapiro and
Wilk, 1965] and reject it for only 11.4% of the respondents. Assuming a uniform distribution
within each interval of the score, mean beliefs are constructed as the summation over intervals of
the product of the mid-point of the bin and the probability assigned by the student to that bin. The
variance of the distribution of beliefs is obtained as the summation over intervals of the product
of the square of the mid-point of the bin and the probability assigned to the bin minus the square
of mean beliefs. We alternatively consider the median, defined as the midpoint of the interval in
which the cumulative density of beans first surpasses 0.5 (11 beans or more), and the inter-quantile
range, defined as the difference between the midpoints of the intervals that accumulate 75% and
25% of the beans.
Figure 1 depicts the timing of the activities related to the intervention (in italics) as well as
the important dates of the assignment process and of the school calendar year (in bold). Students
took the mock exam early during the second half of the 2013-14 academic year. The survey was
administered one or two weeks after the application of the mock test, right before the submission
of the school rankings. Both the elicitation of beliefs about exam performance and the delivery
of individual feedback on test performance occurred during the survey, in a setting secluded from
other students or school staff in order to avoid the role of peer effects and/or social image concerns
when reporting [Ewers and Zimmermann, 2015; Burks et al., 2013]. After a first elicitation of
beliefs, surveyors showed each student a personalized graph with two pre-printed bars: the average
4. How sure are you that you are going to eat at least one tortilla next week?
If respondents grasp the intuition behind our approach, they should provide an answer for question 2 that is larger
than or equal to the answer in question 1, since the latter event is nested in the former. Similarly, respondents should
report fewer beans in question 3 (close to zero probability event) than in question 4 (close to one probability event).
Whenever students made mistakes, the surveyor repeated the explanation as many times as necessary before moving
forward. We are confident that the elicitation of beliefs has worked well since only 11 students (0.3%) ended up
making mistakes in these practice questions.
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score in the universe of applicants during the 2013 edition of the school assignment mechanism and
the average mock exam score in her class. Both pre-printed bars served the purpose of providing
the student with additional elements to better frame her own score, which is the main object of
interest of the analysis. Surveyors plotted a third bar corresponding to the student’s score in the
mock exam and then elicit again the subjective distributions of performance in the exam.
2.3 Sample Selection and Randomization
To select the experimental sample, we focus on middle schools with a considerable mass of ap-
plicants in the 2012 placement round (more than 30) and that are located in neighborhoods with
high or very high poverty levels (according to the National Population Council in 2010). The latter
criterion responds to previous evidence that shows that less privileged students tend to be relatively
more misinformed when making educational choices [Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Avery and
Hoxby, 2012]. In the year 2012, 44 percent of the applicants enrolled in schools from more afflu-
ent neighborhoods took preparatory courses before submitting their school rankings, but this figure
drops to 12 percent among applicants from schools in high poverty areas. Among the applicants
in our sample, 16 percent report previous exposure to a mock test of the admission exam with
performance feedback, and this share is balanced across treatment arms (see Table 1). Despite our
focus on less advantaged students, Table B.1 in the Appendix shows that our sample of ninth-grade
students is largely comparable to the general population of applicants in terms of initial credentials
such as GPA in middle school or admission exam score.
Schools that comply with the criteria imposed are grouped into four geographic regions and ter-
ciles of school average performance amongst ninth graders in a national standardized test aimed at
measuring academic achievement (ENLACE, 2012). Treatment assignment is randomized within
strata at the school level. As a result, 44 schools are assigned to a treatment group in which we
administer the mock exam and provide face-to-face feedback on performance, 46 schools are as-
signed to a “placebo” group in which we only administer the mock exam, and 28 schools constitute
a pure control group. Beliefs are measured twice for students in the treatment group, both before
and after the provision of feedback, and once for students in the placebo and in the control group.
Within each school, we randomly pick one ninth grade classroom to participate in the experiment.8
8We select at most 10 schools in each of the 12 strata. Whenever possible, we allow for the possibility of over-
subscription of schools in each stratum in order to prevent fall backs from the sample due to implementation failures.
Since compliance with the treatment assignment was perfect, the 28 over-sampled schools constitute a pure control
group that is randomized-out of the intervention. Some strata are less dense than others and hence contributed to the
final sample with fewer schools, which explains why schools that belong to the control group are present in 8 out of
12 strata. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the geographic locations of the schools that participate in the experiment.
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The mock exam was administered to 2,978 students in 90 schools, and a subset of 2,732 were
also present in the follow-up survey. Since the delivery of feedback about test performance took
place during the survey, it cannot induce differential attrition patterns. Adding the 912 students
from the 28 schools of the control group yields a sample of 3,644 observations. Among those, 89
percent (3,251 students) are matched with the administrative data of the school assignment system.
The discrepancy between the survey and the administrative data is driven by students’ choices not
to participate in the assignment system, and it is balanced across treatment arms (see column 1
of Table B.2 in the Appendix). We focus on the 2,825 of applicants who are assigned in the first
round of the matching algorithm since only school rankings (and thus, beliefs) and exam scores
matter for their placement.9 Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics and a balancing test of
the randomization for the pre-determined covariates used in the empirical analysis. Very few and
erratic significant differences are detected across treatment arms.
3 Reduced Form Evidence and Treatment Impacts
3.1 Subjective Expectations About Test Performance
We first provide some descriptive patterns of the beliefs elicited in the survey using data from the
control group. Figure 2 shows that students allocate very low probability mass to the event of scor-
ing in the lowest or in the highest score interval. The median of beans is zero in the first interval,
it increases monotonically over the score support up to the fourth interval, and then goes back to
zero in the top interval. The figure displays a large degree of variability of beliefs in intermedi-
ate areas of the support, which is consistent with less bunching of the beans over those intervals.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present some correlation patterns between individual characteristics
and the first two moments of the belief distributions. Male students as well as those with higher
GPAs in middle school and previous exposure to mock exams that provided feedback tend to have
higher mean beliefs about their performance in the admission exam. Background also seems to
matter, as children from more educated fathers report belief distributions with higher means. Some
personality traits can further explain the cross-section of mean beliefs about performance in the
admission exam. The variance of the belief distributions is, in turn, less correlated with observable
characteristics; the only salient patterns are that male students and those who ascribe themselves as
’perseverant’ tend to have tighter belief distributions. These patterns are largely confirmed when
9The exposure to the mock test or the performance feedback therein does not systematically affect the fraction of
applicants assigned in the first or second round of the assignment process (see columns 2 and 3 of Table B.2 in the
Appendix).
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we focus on the median and the inter-quantile range as alternative measures of the location and the
scale of the individual distributions of beliefs (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 2).
Figure 3 goes on to characterize the gap between subjective expectations and realized perfor-
mance in the admission test for students in the control group. We define the perception gap based
on mean beliefs (solid line) but also introduce more flexible definitions that take into account
the dispersion in the individual belief distributions by adding/subtracting one standard deviation
to/from mean beliefs (dashed lines). Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots the cumulative densities of these
alternative definitions of the perception gap. Focusing on the solid line, about three-quarters of the
sample expect to perform above their actual exam score. The divergence between mean beliefs
and the score represents, on average, 24 percent of actual performance in the exam, and it seems
to be twice as large among students with upwardly biased beliefs (39 percent) than among those
with downwardly biased beliefs (17 percent). Even after accounting for the variance in the indi-
vidual belief distributions, we confirm that students hold inaccurate perceptions about their own
performance: the score in the admission test falls outside a one-standard-deviation window around
mean beliefs for roughly half of students in the control group. Panel (b) in Figure 3 further shows
that students with lower scores tend to have both larger and noisier gaps, as well as over-optimistic
expectations about their performance in the test. Instead, students with higher scores have both
more accurate and more precise beliefs, and they tend to underestimate their academic skills.
Providing information about individual performance in the mock exam allows students to sub-
stantially revise their beliefs. The OLS estimates reported in Table 3 show that mean beliefs in the
treatment group decrease on average by 6 points (column 1), while the standard deviation of beliefs
goes down by about 1.5 points (column 2). The magnitude of these effects on both moments are
relatively similar and they are equivalent to 8-9 percent of the corresponding means in the control
group. Taking the mock test without the provision of performance feedback does not generate
any differential updating behavior in terms of the mean, but instead seems to increase the noise
in students’ performance predictions. The standard deviation of the subjective belief distributions
increases on average by 1.2 points. This effect is comparable in magnitude to the simultaneous
reduction in the dispersion of beliefs generated by the performance feedback.
The average effect of performance feedback in the mock test on the location of the belief dis-
tributions masks diverging shifts among applicants with perception gaps of opposing signs (see
Figure 3). Column 3 of Table 3 shows that, conditional on exam taking, the delivery of the in-
dividual scores in the mock test shrinks the absolute value of the perception gaps by 6.7 points
on average. The magnitude of this effect is quite large as it is equivalent to a third of the mean
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absolute gap in the placebo group.10
The top two panels of Figure 4 present non-parametric estimates of the relationship between the
perception gaps and the score in the mock exam as well as the relationship between the individual
standard deviations of beliefs and the score in the mock exam, estimated separately for students in
the treatment group and in the placebo group. The evidence displayed in Panel (a) shows that the
update on mean beliefs in response to performance feedback occurs across the entire distribution
of the mock test, with corresponding larger gap reductions among lower performing students as
they start off with larger biases. As shown in Panel (b), changes in the second moment of the belief
distributions are in turn more predominant among better performing students.
3.2 School Choices and Assignment Patterns
In this setting, schools differ in terms of the curricular track, or modality, that they offer. Aca-
demically oriented high-school programs tend to provide students with general skills and adequate
training to pursue a college education. Non-academic schools, either technical or vocational, fo-
cus more on fostering specific skills that are geared toward the access to the labor market after
secondary education. Schools also vary greatly in terms of their selectivity and, in turn, the level
of their academic requirements for graduation. The assignment mechanism described in Section
2.1 generates sorting across schools based on individual performance in the admission exam. In
the context of the assignment mechanism under study, the admission cut-off score is a good proxy
for peers’ quality and the associated level and pace of instruction – e.g., median scores are almost
perfectly correlated with cut-off scores. Since equilibrium cut-off scores in 2013 are observable
by the applicants at the time they submit their school rankings for the 2014 placement round, we
rely on them to measure selectivity and construct an indicator based on whether the cut-off for any
given school falls above or below the median across all schools (irrespectively of the curricular
track). As shown in Figure A.3 in the Appendix, academic schools are more selective on average
than non-academic schools although there is a large overlap in the cut-off score distributions across
tracks.
Relying again on data from the control group, we start by documenting the role of subjec-
tive beliefs on school choices and the related placement patterns within the school assignment
mechanism. Column 1 of Table 4 shows the estimates of an OLS regression of the share of aca-
demic options listed in the school rankings on z-scores of mean beliefs, exam scores, and middle
10All the results shown in Table 3 are robust to alternative measures of the location and the scale of the subjective
belief distributions, such as the median and the inter-quantile range (75th-25th percentile). See Table B.3 in the
Appendix.
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school GPA. Mean beliefs have a positive and significant effect on students’ demand for academic
schools: a one-standard-deviation increase in expected test performance is associated with an aver-
age 4.3-percentage points increase in the share of academic options in the school rankings, which
is approximately a 7 percent increase when compared to the sample average. The magnitude of
the estimated effect of GPA is very similar, whereas the size of the coefficient estimated for the
score in the admission test is roughly half and it is not statistically different from zero. Column
2 of Table 4 shows the effect of the same covariates on the probability of being admitted into an
academic school. A one-standard-deviation increase in expected test performance is associated
with an increase of 4.1 percentage points in the fraction of students admitted into an academic
program. The coefficient on exam scores is not statistically significant, and it is not different from
the coefficient of mean beliefs (p-value=0.88). In sum, students who think they are a good match
with academic programs demand them relatively more and, conditional on their performance in
the admission exam, they are more likely to get admitted into one of those programs.
We next discuss whether and how the information intervention alters the realized sorting pat-
terns of students across tracks. To do so, we rely on the score in the mock exam as a proxy of
academic achievement that is realized before students submit their school rankings. This implies
that we can only compare students in the treatment and in the placebo groups for this part of the
analysis, since we do not have information on the score in the mock test for the students in the
control group. As mentioned in Section 2.1, school placement under the assignment mechanism
exclusively depends on two student-level observable factors: individual school rankings and the
score in the admission exam. To the extent that the intervention does not systematically alter exam
scores (see column 5 in Table B.2 in the Appendix),11 any treatment-placebo differences in the
final assignment of students across curricular tracks is mainly driven by the observed differential
changes in the demand for academic programs. Panel (c) of Figure 4 depicts non-parametric es-
timates of the slope of the demand for academic programs with respect to the score in the mock
test for both the treatment group and the placebo group. The demand for these programs becomes
more sensitive to realized achievement for students who receive performance feedback. The verti-
cal difference between these two curves suggests the presence of a negative treatment effect on the
share of academic options for students in the bottom half of the score distribution and a positive
treatment effect for students with scores in the upper half of the distribution.
11These results suggest that the effect of the informational intervention on behavior is short-lived and does not
significantly affect the effort exerted for the admission exam, which takes place more than 4 months after the provision
of feedback about performance in the mock test. While we cannot rule out other distributional changes in the score
of the admission exam due to exam taking and/or the provision of performance feedback, this evidence is consistent
with recent experimental findings reported in Azmat et al. [2018], whereby the short-term responses to the provision
of information on ordinal ranking to college students in Spain are completely diluted over time.
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The OLS estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4 confirm that the provision of performance
feedback does not affect the demand for academic programs for students with test scores around the
sample average. The positive and significant estimated coefficient on the interaction term between
the feedback provision indicator and the z-score in the mock test implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the score of the mock test increases on average the share of academic schools
requested by the applicants in the treatment group by 3.5 percentage points, which represents a 6
percentage points increase with respect to the average in the placebo group. This compositional
change in the demand for academic schools significantly alters the assignment patterns realized un-
der the mechanism, as shown in Panel (d) of Figure 4. The corresponding OLS estimates reported
in column 4 of Table 4 imply that the fraction of students admitted into an academic program goes
up by 4.8 percentage points in response to a one standard deviation increase in the mock exam
score, which corresponds to a 10 percent increase relative to the average admission probability in
an academic school among the placebo group.12
The estimates reported in column 1 of Table 5 show that the score in the admission exam has a
more prominent role in explaining the composition of school rankings in terms of selectivity when
compared to both mean beliefs and the GPA in middle school. This pattern is much starker when
we consider the probability of assignment in a selective school in Column 2, which is in line with
a placement mechanism that relies on the exam score to determine priority indexes. The evidence
reported in Column 3 and 4 of Table 5 shows that the provision of performance feedback in the
mock test does not systematically alter preferences for or assignment into selective schools.
3.3 High-School Trajectories
The centralized assignment mechanism seems to deliver school-placement outcomes that are sat-
isfactory for the great majority of the applicants, at least in the short-run. About 80 percent of the
students in the control group enroll in the school they were assigned in the first placement round.
However, among these students, only 56 percent graduate on time from high school – i.e. three
years after enrollment in tenth grade. There is some heterogeneity by track, with timely graduation
rates in the academic and non-academic tracks at 66 and 45 percent, respectively, which may be
partly explained by selection issues across tracks. These figures are not peculiar to the experimen-
tal sample (see Table B.1 in the Appendix) and they clearly reflect inadequate academic progress
through upper secondary education due to either school dropout or grade retention, which are both
12All the results shown in Table 4 are robust to alternative measures of academic achievement, such as the score
in the admission exam and the cumulative GPA in middle school, which are measured at the end of ninth grade – i.e.,
after the provision of performance feedback. See Table B.4 in the Appendix.
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strong indicators of mismatch between schools and students.
As shown above, the provision of performance feedback improved the alignment between
(measured) academic skills and track choices. The associated changes in school placement may
thus result in a better match that can further foster individual performance along the education
careers of the students in the treatment group. The OLS estimates reported in Column 1 of Table 6
show that, on average, there are no discernible differences in the high-school enrollment rates be-
tween students in the treatment and placebo groups when compared to those in the control group.
However, conditional on enrollment, the probability of graduation on time is 8 percentage points
higher for students who receive performance feedback when compared to those who did not take
the test (Column 2). The magnitude of this average effect is quite remarkable, as it corresponds
to a 15 percent increase in high-school graduation rates when compared to the sample average in
the control group.13 The average effect of exam taking on high-school graduation rates is positive
and roughly half of the size of the coefficient of performance feedback, although it is not statisti-
cally different from zero. Also, we can barely reject equality between the coefficient of feedback
provision and the one of exam taking (p-value=0.10). This last result suggests that the underlying
changes in the dispersion of the belief distributions for the placebo group documented above (see
Table 3) may have had an independent effect on school choices and, through those, on the resulting
match between schools and students. We will revisit this result in Section 5, where we explore the
link between changes in the two moments of the individual belief distributions and school choices.
We next rely on the score in the admission exam as a potential source of variation for the
longer-term impacts of the intervention, as it is the most recent standardized measure of student
achievement before entering high school. The corresponding estimates are reported in column 3
of Table 6. They reveal that the estimated effect of exam taking on high-school graduation rates
accrues from the group of students who score in the bottom quintile of the distribution. The longer-
term effects of performance feedback are present around both tails of the score distribution. Even
though we find larger effects on timely graduation due to performance feedback than due to exam
taking among students in the bottom quintile, we cannot reject that the two treatment effects are
equal (p-value=0.22).
13Despite all our efforts, we were not able to obtain the enrollment and high school records from one school
affiliated with the National University of Mexico State (UAEM), as well as the high school records from another public
institution, the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN). In our sample, only one student was assigned to the UAEM school
and 171 were assigned to IPN schools (6 percent).
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4 School Choice Model
4.1 Empirical Framework
Let the indirect utility of student i from attending school j follow a random coefficients specifica-
tion:
uij = S
′
jαi + V
′
ijβ + δj + ij. (1)
In this model, Sj is a vector of school j specific factors such as the curricular track or the
degree of selectivity. The vector Vij includes observable student-school specific factors that may
further shape school choices in this setting such as the physical distance between students and
schools. Since the costs of commuting may vary depending on socio-economic status, distance is
further interacted with a set of students’ background variables (whether or not at least one parent
has college education, whether or not the student lives with both parents, and being above or below
the median of a household asset index). Abusing notation, we let δj capture unobserved school-
institution characteristics and ij represents unobserved idiosyncratic tastes for each school. With
nearly 600 schools, it is not feasible to include school-specific constant terms in the model. How-
ever, schools are quite homogenous within the nine public institutions sponsoring the high-school
programs within the assignment system. Each institution offers only one curricular track and
the between-institution variation in cut-off scores is much larger than the corresponding variation
within institutions.14
The parameter capturing student preferences for school characteristics is further allowed to
depend on observable and unobservable characteristics. For simplicity, we consider a linear speci-
fication:
αi = α¯ + αµµi + ασσi + vi. (2)
As shown in Section 2, the returns from attending the academic track in high school feature a
clear gradient with respect to individuals’ academic skills since they are conditional on success-
fully completing a college education. We use the mean, µi, and the standard deviation, σi, of the
performance beliefs elicited in the survey in order to characterize the subjective ability distributions
of the students in our sample.15 The vi term captures individual-specific characteristics unobserv-
able to the researcher that may introduce differential valuation of Sj across students, including
14Qualitative evidence from the pilot stages of the intervention indicates that applicants tend to identify the different
schools made available through the assignment system mainly through their affiliation with a given institution.
15For students in the treatment group, we use the belief distributions elicited after the delivery of performance
feedback.
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personality traits, parental support, and peer effects, among others.
Substituting (2) into (1), we obtain
uij = S
′
jµiαµ + S
′
jσiασ + S
′
jvi + V
′
ijβ + ωj + ij, (3)
where,
ωj = δj + S
′
jα¯. (4)
We assume that ij is i.i.d. over i and j with a type-I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution
and vi is i.i.d. over i with a normal distribution. The model described by equations (3)-(4) takes
the form of a logit model with random coefficients, which generates flexible substitution patterns
across different schooling alternatives.
4.2 Identification
Unlike standard empirical demand models (see, e.g. Berry [1994]; Nevo [2000]; Ackerberg et al.
[2007]), here we are not interested in assessing counterfactual changes in observed characteristics
that vary over alternatives but rather in changes in school choices induced by movements in the
individual belief distributions. Hence, we do not need to separately identify α¯ from δj in (4). The
remaining parameters of equation (3) can thus be identified within a traditional discrete choice
framework with school-institution constant terms, ωj , that capture the overall average valuation of
each alternative. The inclusion of subjective perceptions of ability in (2) introduces an endogeneity
problem, as µi and σi may be correlated with the unobservable individual traits captured by vi. To
overcome this issue, we leverage the variation in beliefs induced by the information intervention
using a control function approach [Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999; Petrin and Train, 2009].16
The random assignment of exam taking and performance feedback across the students in our
sample has been shown to differentially alter beliefs (see Table 3) but is otherwise independent of
the unobserved component vi and the random taste shock, ij . Let treatment status be denoted by
the couple of indicator functions {Ti, Zi}, where Ti is takes the value of one for the students in
the treatment group – i.e. exam taking and performance feedback – and is equal to zero otherwise
while Zi is equal to one for the students in the placebo group – i.e. only exam taking – and is
equal to zero otherwise. The orthogonality condition implies that the conditional distribution of the
unobserved preferences term in equation (3) depends on the instruments and the belief distributions
16For extensions of the control function approach in non-parametric and semi-parametric discrete choice models,
see Blundell and Powell [2003, 2004].
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only through the associated control function components, ξµi and ξ
σ
i :
F (vi | µi, σi, Ti, Zi) = F (vi | ξµi , ξσi , Ti, Zi) = F (vi | ξµi , ξσi ), (5)
which are reduced-form errors of linear projections of µi and σi on {Ti, Zi} and the full set
of covariates that enter in (3). The random coefficients logit model augmented with these control
function terms writes as:
uij = S
′
jµiαµ + S
′
jσiασ + S
′
jvi + V
′
ijβ + ωj + (ξ
µ
i × Sj)′λµ + (ξσi × Sj)′λσ + ij. (6)
Under assumption (5), the terms ξµi and ξ
σ
i in (6) act as a sufficient statistics that fully char-
acterizes the correlation between performance beliefs and the unobserved preference component.
The associated λ parameters are jointly identified with the other parameters of the school choice
model and can be used to test directly for the endogeneity of beliefs.
4.3 Estimation
Estimation is carried out in two steps. In the first step, we fit linear models for each of the two
moments of the belief distribution as a function of the two instruments along with school char-
acteristics, household characteristics, high-school institution fixed effects and indicators for the
randomization strata.17 In the second step, the parameters of the school choice model are esti-
mated by maximum likelihood using the first-step residuals as additional covariates, as shown in
equation (6) above. Valid standard errors are obtained by clustered (or block) bootstrap replications
of the two-step procedure, with the clusters being defined at the student-level.
A common approach in the school choice literature is to estimate preference parameters in (6)
using a rank-ordered logit [Hausman and Ruud, 1987] for the school rankings submitted by the
applicants. This estimator can be seen as a collection of conditional logit models: one for the top-
ranked school being the most preferred, another for the second-ranked school being preferred to
all schools except the one ranked first, and so on. This approach relies on the assumption that the
school rankings reflect true preference orderings over schools. When there is limited uncertainty
about admission outcomes as in our setting, students are likely to behave strategically. For example,
students with a low priority index may skip highly selective schools they truly like since they expect
a zero admission probability based on past cut-off scores and their beliefs about test performance
[Haeringer and Klijn, 2009; Calsamiglia et al., 2010]. Incompleteness of the rankings, either due
17These strata dummies serve the only purpose of adjusting the first-step parameters for the design of the experiment
(see Section 2.3), hence the linear predictions that generate the residuals do not include their estimated coefficients.
19
to the limit of 20 schools imposed by the system or self-censoring, reinforces the incentives to
behave strategically.18
Recent approaches have proposed to rely on weaker assumptions to estimate student prefer-
ences with data from matching mechanisms based on the deferred-acceptance algorithm [Fack
et al., forthcoming]. Under stability, or “envy-freeness” of the matching outcome, and given
market-clearing cut-off scores, students are satisfied with their placement ex-post [Azevedo and
Leshno, 2016]. Hence, one can estimate the parameters in (6) through a school choice model of
placement with individual-specific choice sets, which are defined as the set of schools with equi-
librium cut-off scores that are weakly lower than the applicant’s score in the admission test. In
our setting, students have access to very detailed information about schools’ cut-off scores in the
three past rounds of the assignment mechanism. These data greatly reduce the level of uncertainty
regarding the supply side as they tend to be very persistent over time; indeed, the linear correlation
between cut-off scores in 2013 and those realized in 2014 is 95 percent. In addition, the coin-
cidence between ex-post feasible choice sets and ex-ante perceived feasible choice sets based on
beliefs about own performance is remarkably high. Only 1.8% of the students have less than 90%
of their feasible choice set contained in their expected feasible choice set. Expected choice sets are
always larger than realized choice sets due to the presence of uncertainty in the belief distributions,
and they fully contain realized choice sets for 82 percent of the applicants in our sample.
The final sample we use in estimation is comprised of 2,825 students and 589 school alterna-
tives that are chosen by at least one student, for a total of 1,663,925 student-school observations.
Imposing feasible choice sets for each student results in 1,329,441 observations.
4.4 Results
The full set of OLS parameters of the first-stage relationships for both the mean and the standard
deviation of individual beliefs is reported in Table B.5 in the Appendix. The estimated treatment
effects are very similar to the ones discussed in Section 3.1 and reported in Table 3. The results
confirm a sizable and robust negative effect of performance feedback on both the mean and the
standard deviation of beliefs and a positive effect of taking the mock test on the standard deviation
of beliefs.
Table 7 presents maximum-likelihood estimates of the school choice model with the control
function terms but without the random coefficients for school characteristics. Column 1 shows se-
lected coefficients of interest estimated under a rank-ordered logit model while column 2 shows the
18The median student in our sample ranks 10 schools and only 2 percent of the students fill-in the entire list of 20
schools. Self-censoring in school rankings may be explained by psychological costs of ranking so many alternatives.
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same coefficients estimated under a logit model for school placement with individual-specific fea-
sible choice sets. While the estimated coefficients of the mean of the belief distributions about test
performance are very similar across the two estimators, the coefficients of the dispersion of beliefs
tend to be attenuated and less precisely estimated under the conditional logit specification. The
magnitudes of other estimated coefficients also differ quite substantially between the two specifi-
cations, which suggest that the truth-telling assumption behind the observed school rankings may
be violated in this setting. Under truth-telling, the parameters estimated in both models are con-
sistent, but the rank-ordered logit is more efficient. Under stability, without truth-telling, only the
conditional logit is consistent [Fack et al., forthcoming]. The associated Hausman test [Hausman,
1978] is reported in the bottom line of Table 7 and strongly rejects truth-telling in our data.
Table 8 presents the estimates of the random coefficients school choice model presented in
equation (6) as our preferred model specification. Comparing columns 1 and 2, we notice remark-
able differences in the estimated parameters associated with the individual perceptions about test
performance when endogeneity of the beliefs is ignored. However, most of the other estimated
coefficients are very similar in magnitude and precision under both specifications. The role of
perceived academic ability in driving sorting patterns across schools is substantially attenuated
when students’ beliefs are considered exogenous in the discrete choice model. For instance, the
estimated coefficient for the interaction effect between the standard deviation of beliefs about test
performance and the academic track indicator becomes very large in magnitude and statistically
significant once endogeneity is taken into account, whereas the corresponding estimate without the
control function terms is negligible. This result underscores the importance of tackling possible
endogeneity concerns in the estimation of choice models based on subjective expectations.19
Individual beliefs about test performance appear to have relatively large effects on the value of
attending an academically-oriented school. A one-standard-deviation increase in the mean of the
subjective ability distribution (15.3 points) is equivalent to a decrease in the physical distance to
a given school of 3.8km-4.4km (depending on SES), which is more than one third of a standard
deviation of the distance across all student-school pairs in the sample. Conditional on the mean of
the subjective belief distributions, students who are more uncertain about their own skills find it less
attractive to attend more academically-oriented schools. The distance-equivalent effect associated
to a one-standard-deviation-increase in the dispersion of the belief distributions (7.9 points) is very
similar in magnitude to that implied by a change in the mean, but with the opposite sign. Smaller
19Another indication of the bias in the coefficients estimated in column 1 of Table 8 is the fact that most control
function terms in column 2 are statistically different from zero (see Table B.6 in the Appendix for the full list of
parameter estimates) – as confirmed by the p-value of the F-Test for joint significance of the λ parameters of equation
(6), which is reported in the last row of Table 8.
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and less precise effects for the role of the location and the scale of the subjective distributions of
test performance are found for the value of attending more selective schools. These results are
broadly consistent with the reduced-form evidence reported in Tables 4 and 5, which reveal larger
responses to performance feedback in terms of the choice of the curricular track than in terms of
school selectivity.
The random coefficients estimates reveal a large degree of heterogeneity in preferences for
the academic track. This finding documents the potential role of other individual determinants of
students’ preferences beyond the subjective belief distributions elicited in our survey. While we
remain agnostic as to whether or not the information intervention may have altered some of these
unobserved factors, the inclusion of random coefficients effectively captures their composite role
in explaining school choices and sorting patterns. We did not include a random coefficient for
the geodesic distance between students and schools as it features very limited dispersion across
students after including the interaction terms with students’ socioeconomic status.20
5 Using the Model To Unpack Treatment Impacts
5.1 Performance Feedback
The relatively large magnitudes and the opposing signs of the preference parameters related to the
two moments of the distributions of perceived ability may provide a rationale behind the heteroge-
neous effects of performance feedback on choices (see Section 3). As previously shown in Table 3,
providing information about individual performance in the mock test reduces the perception gap,
moving the location of the distribution of perceived performance closer to actual performance.
However, the intervention also reduces the variance in individual beliefs distributions, which could
either reinforce or deter the effect through the mean on choices. The divergence in the location
of the updating patterns seems to explain the larger effect on school choices among students with
relatively higher scores in the mock test, who are also more likely to revise their beliefs upwards.
Indeed, among students who update their mean beliefs upwards, the decrease in the dispersion
of beliefs strengthens the positive effect of mean beliefs on the probability of choosing academic
schools and/or more selective schools. Conversely, among those who update downwards, the re-
duction in variance counteracts the negative effect on mean beliefs, partially undoing the impact of
performance feedback on choices. The net effect of feedback provision on school choices depends
20We tried different specifications for the control function terms, such as one specification with a more general
correlation structure as well as a non-linear specification. We have also estimated the random coefficients discrete
choice model using the median and the inter-quantile range as alternative measures of the location and the scale of the
subjective ability distributions. These alternatives yield very similar results as shown in Table B.7 in the Appendix.
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thus to the interplay between changes in the mean and in the dispersion of the distributions of
perceived performance in the test.
In order to quantitatively illustrate this mechanism, we simulate the school choice model at
estimated parameters under our preferred specification (see column 2 of Table 8) for the group
of students in the treatment group for whom we have collected performance beliefs twice. We
focus on track choices as this seems to be the most salient margin of response in school choices
due to the provision of performance feedback. Choices in terms of school selectivity are indeed
less responsive to beliefs, as shown in Section 3, as they are mostly determined by the placement
allocation mechanism. We first impute the mean and the variance of the belief distributions elicited
before the delivery of the feedback and predict choice probabilities under this prior scenario. We
then proceed to progressively incorporate observed updates at the individual-level in the mean and
in the variance using the distributions of beliefs about test performance elicited after the provision
of performance feedback so as to disentangle their relative contribution on track choices. Given the
relative small size of the experimental sample (roughly 3,000 students) when compared to the size
of the applicants’ pool (over 300,000 students), it is highly unlikely for the intervention to have
aggregate consequences on the equilibrium admission cut-off scores. Thus, we can safely assume
that the feasible choice sets are not altered by the receipt of performance feedback for students in
the treatment group and keep them fixed in our simulations.21
Panel (a) of Figure 5 plots the average changes in the predicted choice probabilities for an
academically-oriented high-school program by quintiles of the score in the mock test while panel
(b) depicts the associated average changes in beliefs due to performance feedback. On average,
students with test scores in the lowest quintile are 5 percentage points less likely to choose schools
from the academic track after receiving performance feedback in the mock test. This drop in the
demand for academic programs is mostly driven by large downward updates in the location of the
distribution, which are responsible for a 7.5 percentage point decrease in choice probabilities of
academic schools. The attenuating effect of the variance is smaller, in line with relatively lower
variance reductions observed in this sub-sample. In turn, students in the second quintile of the
mock exam distribution experience a close to zero effect of performance feedback on track choices,
which can be explained by simultaneous effects on the two moments of the belief distribution that
are similar in magnitude but with opposite signs. In the third and fourth quartiles we find modest
increases in the demand for academic track schools (a 3 percentage-point increase in the choice
probability), which are mostly explained by large reductions in dispersion of beliefs due to the
21Extrapolating our experimental findings at a larger scale would require simulating individual school preferences
under the new information scenario and computing the resulting equilibrium cut-off scores. This exercise is not
feasible in our setting due to the lack of data on elicited beliefs beyond the experimental sample.
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performance feedback. The negative effect of the downward revision of mean beliefs is more than
offset by the drop in the dispersion of the belief distributions. The ones who experience the largest
positive changes in the probability of choosing an academic school are those in the top quintile
of the score distribution. The 8 percentage point increase estimated for them is explained by the
mutually reinforcing effects that the variance and the mean have on choices.
This evidence is in line with the non-parametric results on track choices shown in panel (c) of
Figure 4, which document that the provision of performance feedback generates a steeper gradient
in the demand for academic programs with respect to the score in the mock test, with relatively
more pronounced effects on choices found among students with higher scores in the mock test.
5.2 Exam Taking
We have shown in Section 3 evidence on the impact of feedback provision. Since our focus is on
mismatch, we relied on pre-treatment scores in the mock exam as a measure of ability and evaluated
how school choices changed according to such measure. With the results from the model and the
simulations at hand, we understand that this comparison yields an upper bound on the estimates of
the treatment effect on track choices. Since the increase in the variance for students in the placebo
group may have discouraged students to choose the academic track, the estimated treatment effect
relative to the placebo group is likely an upper bound for the effect of the feedback provision on
track choices.
We use the model to isolate and quantify the relative importance of exam taking when compared
to feedback provision on track choices. To do so, we start by predicting choice probabilities based
on the estimates of the school choice model (see column 2 of Table 8) and using the beliefs elicited
in the survey for the group of students in the control group. We then perform counterfactual
simulations by adding the estimated average treatment effect of exam taking to the individual
standard deviations of beliefs, as shown in column 2 of Table 3. While admittedly imprecise,
this approach aims to overcome the lack of longitudinal belief data for students outside of the
treatment group. Panel (a) of Figure 6 reports the resulting average changes in the probability of
choosing academically-oriented schools by quintile of the score in the admission exam, which is
the only ability measure that is available for students in the control group. Exam taking would
uniformly decrease the demand for academic schools by roughly 2 percentage points. Among
students who score in the bottom quintile of the distribution of the admission exam, the drop
in choice probabilities of academic schools is comparable to the one induced by performance
feedback in spite of much larger changes in both the mean and the variance of beliefs triggered by
the latter (see panel (b) of Figure 6).
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All in all, the evidence drawn from these simulations may help reconcile the longer-term ef-
fects of the intervention on high-school trajectories. As we have shown in Section 3.3, the rates
of graduation on time increase among students who receive performance feedback in the bottom
and top quintiles of the exam-score distribution relative to the control group (see column 3 of Ta-
ble 6). The results discussed in Section 5.1 showed that this focalized effect at the tails responds
to the partial offset that simultaneous changes in mean and variance have on track choices, espe-
cially in intermediate ability levels. Uninformative signals, such as exam taking, that exclusively
increase the noise in beliefs about academic ability may have a more direct pass-though into track
choices. Indeed, the increase in variance induced by exam taking contracts the demand for aca-
demic schools among relatively under-performing students and almost to the same extent among
their counterparts in the performance feedback group. The displacement of low performing stu-
dents away from the academic track under exam taking improves their match with schools, thereby
enhancing timely graduation rates in high school.
5.3 Counterfactual Updates
We finally consider an updating counterfactual inspired by recent experimental evidence that posits
the presence of a ‘good news effect’ in updating patterns about individuals’ own traits [Eil and Rao,
2011; Mobius et al., 2011]. We simulate choice probabilities based on the estimated parameters
and the longitudinal belief data according to a scenario in which students in the treatment group
change their beliefs from the prior to the posterior distribution only when the performance feedback
exceeds the mean of the prior belief distributions. In the case in which the feedback falls short of
the prior’s mean, we assume that students discard the feedback by leaving their beliefs unchanged.
Figure 7 reports the simulation results for the updating counterfactual described above against
the observed updating patterns as a benchmark. The resulting average changes in choice probabil-
ities for an academically-oriented high-school program are reported in Panel (a) while the associ-
ated average changes in beliefs by quintiles of the score in the mock test are shown in Panel (b).
The simulation results document that the demand for academic programs would monotonically in-
crease across the score distribution. This is not surprising given the rather extreme assumptions on
selective updating that we impose in this counterfactual scenario. Since the probability of updating
upwards increases with ability (see panel b of Figure 5), the change in choice probabilities will
follow the same trend.
When compared to the realized sorting patterns, the average effects in choice probabilities are
comparable to the observed treatment effect for students in the top three quintiles of the score
in the mock test while they diverge among worse performing students, who are more likely to
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update downward as a result of the performance feedback. The changes in choice probabilities
documented under this counterfactual scenario suggest less assortative sorting patterns across high-
school tracks in terms of students’ skills when compared to those realized under the feedback-
provision experiment. Lower performing students may end up placed into academic schools due
to the excessive weight put on positive signals about their own skills, with potentially detrimental
consequences on high-school trajectories.
6 Conclusion
Individuals’ lack of adequate and timely information about their own academic potential partly
explains unfit educational choices that may eventually lead to mismatch and dropout later on. This
paper represents one of the first attempts to understand the channels through which the provision
of relevant and personalized information about students’ own academic ability alter school choices
in secondary education and subsequent academic trajectories. We do this in the context of a large-
scale centralized school assignment mechanism in Mexico City by combining a research design
that provides students with randomized information about their performance in a standardized
achievement test, the elicitation of the subjective distributions of academic achievement, and a
structural model of school choices that incorporates the role of subjective beliefs.
Our first set of empirical findings show that students face important knowledge gaps related to
their own academic potential and skills. Providing individualized feedback on academic perfor-
mance substantially shifts the location of the individual belief distributions toward realized perfor-
mance in the mock test and shrinks their dispersion. The treatment-induced changes in beliefs have
real consequences on the sorting patterns across high-school tracks that seem to result in a better
alignment between individual skills and education careers. Follow-up administrative data confirm
that the information intervention effectively improves student outcomes at the end of high school,
raising the probability of graduation on time by 8 percentage points.
In order to better understand the link between changes in beliefs and school choices, we pro-
pose and estimate a discrete choice model in which subjective beliefs about academic ability shape
individual preferences over school characteristics. Simulation results based on the estimates of the
model uncover a novel channel through which feedback provision alters school choices: the inter-
play between the location and the dispersion parameters of the individual distributions of perceived
academic ability. We find that the reduction in the noisiness of beliefs caused by the intervention
may either compensate or reinforce the effects of mean changes depending on the direction of the
update. We also show that noisy signals that remove the mean-adjustment channel have greater
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pass-through into choices, with very heterogenous impacts along the ability distribution. We fi-
nally consider a counterfactual scenario consistent with selective updating based on a ‘good news
effect’. This exercise is informative about the likely effects of information-provision interventions
whenever the updating patterns of the targeted beneficiaries are not rational as often assumed.
These results are informative far beyond the context of Mexico and the centralized admission
system in place. Indeed, the setting is ideal to isolate the role of beliefs on school choices, but the
implications of this analysis apply as well to other settings where students and parents make long-
lasting choices about investments in human capital under uncertainty about individual attributes
and skills. The evidence presented here highlights the potential role of policies aimed at dissemi-
nating information about individual academic skills in order to provide students with better tools
to make well-informed schooling and career choice decisions.
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NOTE: Using data for the control group, the Figure plots different moments of the distribution of probability mass
(beans) allocated to each interval. The extremes of the whiskers plot the lowest and highest values, while the floor and
ceiling of the box denote the 25th and 75th percentiles. The line inside the box represents the median value. Note that
extreme values are excluded. Source: Survey data.
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Figure 3: Gap between Expected and Actual Exam Score - Control Group
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NOTE: Using data for the control group, panel (a) shows the cumulative density of the difference between mean
beliefs and scores in the COMIPEMS admission exam as a percentage of the exam score. For the same sample, panel
(b) depicts locally weighted regressions of the relationship between the relative gap in beliefs and the score in the
admission exam. The dashed lines in both panels are obtained by adding/subtracting one standard deviation to/from
the mean of the individual belief distributions. Source: Survey data and COMIPEMS administrative records.
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Figure 4: Treatment Impacts - Performance Feedback
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NOTE: Locally weighted regressions estimated separately for students in the treatment group and in the placebo group.
Source: Survey data and COMIPEMS administrative records.
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Figure 5: Performance Feedback – Mean and Variance Updates
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NOTE: Simulations based on the estimated random coefficients logit model (see column 2 of Table 8) using data for the
treatment group. The bars in panel (a) denote the average difference in the individual choice probabilities computed
using observed prior and posterior beliefs. ’Mean Update’ denotes a scenario in which only the individual means
of beliefs are set to the level of the posteriors. ’Variance Update’ denotes a scenario in which only the individual
standard deviations of beliefs are set to the level of the posteriors. The bars in panel (b) denote the average changes
between posteriors and priors for students in the treatment group, recorded after and before the delivery of performance
feedback. Source: Survey data and COMIPEMS administrative records.
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Figure 6: Exam Taking Vs. Performance Feedback
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NOTE: Simulations based on the estimated random coefficients logit model (see column 2 of Table 8) using data for
the control group (Exam Taking) and for the treatment group (Performance Feedback). The black bars in panel (a)
denote the average difference in choice probabilities between a scenario with observed beliefs in the control group
and a scenario in which we added the average treatment effect of exam taking (see column 2 of Table 3) to the
individual standard deviations. The grey bars in panel (a) denote the average difference in the individual choice
probabilities computed using prior and posterior beliefs in the treatment group. The black bars in panel (b) denote the
corresponding average changes in beliefs for the control group. The lighter-grey and the darker-grey bars in panel (b)
denote the corresponding average changes in beliefs for the treatment group. Source: Survey data and COMIPEMS
administrative records. 36
Figure 7: Counterfactual Updates – The ’Good News’ Effect
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NOTE: Simulations based on the estimated random coefficients logit model (see column 2 of Table 8) using data for the
treatment group. The bars in panel (a) denote the average difference in the individual choice probabilities computed
using observed prior and posterior beliefs. ’Only Good News’ denotes a scenario in which both the means and the
standard deviations of beliefs are set to the level of the posteriors for individuals with mean priors that are lower than
the score in the mock test and they are set to the level of the priors for individuals with mean priors that are larger than
the score in the mock exam. The bars in panel (b) denote the associated average changes between posteriors and priors
for the treatment group under this ’Only Good News’ scenario. Source: Survey data and COMIPEMS administrative
records.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Randomization Check
Placebo Treated Control T-P P-C T-C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mock exam score 60.939 62.709 1.607
(15.582) (16.419) [1.080]
GPA in middle school 8.139 8.152 8.118 -0.005 0.034 0.012
(0.854) (0.838) (0.828) [0.052] [0.068] [0.061]
Scholarship in middle school 0.110 0.114 0.140 0.001 -0.031 -0.020
(0.313) (0.318) (0.347) [0.016] [0.021] [0.018]
Grade retention in middle school 0.123 0.119 0.130 0.001 -0.009 -0.002
(0.329) (0.324) (0.337) [0.020] [0.027] [0.024]
Does not skip classes 0.972 0.976 0.960 0.006 0.014 0.004
(0.165) (0.153) (0.195) [0.010] [0.012] [0.016]
Plans to go to college 0.722 0.716 0.710 -0.009 -0.008 -0.020
(0.448) (0.451) (0.454) [0.022] [0.031] [0.030]
Male 0.439 0.466 0.473 0.024 -0.023 -0.029
(0.496) (0.499) (0.500) [0.022] [0.027] [0.026]
Disabled status 0.141 0.144 0.150 0.001 0.012 -0.000
(0.349) (0.351) (0.357) [0.017] [0.022] [0.024]
Indigenous ethnicity 0.087 0.104 0.105 0.021 -0.020 -0.019
(0.282) (0.306) (0.307) [0.015] [0.019] [0.020]
Does not give up 0.877 0.890 0.888 0.017 0.006 -0.023
(0.329) (0.313) (0.316) [0.016] [0.019] [0.023]
Tries his best 0.750 0.720 0.665 -0.029 0.022 0.039
(0.433) (0.449) (0.472) [0.022] [0.030] [0.029]
Finishes what he starts 0.727 0.714 0.697 -0.019 -0.008 0.014
(0.446) (0.452) (0.460) [0.020] [0.026] [0.027]
Works hard 0.735 0.740 0.706 0.003 0.017 0.025
(0.442) (0.439) (0.456) [0.024] [0.031] [0.031]
Experienced bullying 0.142 0.150 0.172 0.008 -0.006 -0.018
(0.349) (0.357) (0.378) [0.014] [0.023] [0.022]
Lives with both parents 0.796 0.807 0.750 0.014 0.056 0.050
(0.403) (0.395) (0.433) [0.018] [0.027]** [0.027]*
Works 0.319 0.313 0.383 -0.010 -0.065 -0.036
(0.466) (0.464) (0.486) [0.022] [0.030]** [0.032]
Mother with college degree 0.055 0.051 0.038 -0.004 0.007 -0.009
(0.228) (0.221) (0.190) [0.011] [0.014] [0.009]
Father with college degree 0.099 0.104 0.100 0.006 -0.004 -0.032
(0.299) (0.305) (0.301) [0.016] [0.025] [0.020]
High SES (asset index) 0.496 0.524 0.472 0.022 0.067 -0.018
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) [0.027] [0.034]* [0.029]
Previous mock exam with feedback 0.147 0.191 0.167 0.041 0.004 -0.072
(0.355) (0.393) (0.373) [0.038] [0.048] [0.047]
N. Obs. 1089 1026 710 2115 1799 1736
NOTE: Columns 1-3 report means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Columns 4-6 display the OLS coeffi-
cients of the treatment dummy along with the standard errors (in brackets) for the null hypothesis of zero effect. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. Strata dummies included in all specifications, standard errors clustered at
the middle school level. Source: COMIPEMS administrative records.
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Table 2: Correlates of Individual Beliefs
Mean SD Median IQR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA (middle school) 5.506*** -0.378 6.168*** -0.373
(0.887) (0.365) (0.961) (0.780)
Scholarship in MS 0.435 1.072 0.103 0.552
(1.442) (0.855) (1.681) (1.524)
Grade retention in MS 0.709 1.340 1.849 0.845
(1.884) (1.071) (2.128) (1.663)
Does not skip classes -6.120*** 1.395 -6.037*** 2.969*
(1.701) (1.028) (1.908) (1.590)
Plans to go to college 2.033 0.034 0.924 1.787
(1.300) (0.760) (1.508) (1.377)
Male 3.580*** -1.808*** 4.260*** -1.535
(1.070) (0.634) (1.219) (1.351)
Disabled student -4.143*** -0.624 -5.132*** 1.424
(1.326) (1.089) (1.497) (2.155)
Indigenous student -0.947 -0.092 -0.392 -3.517**
(1.705) (1.274) (1.811) (1.680)
Does not give up 1.761 0.239 2.102 0.709
(1.427) (1.082) (1.622) (1.810)
Tries his best 3.564** -0.735 3.808** -1.498
(1.453) (0.927) (1.512) (1.486)
Finishes what he starts 2.118 -1.954** 3.112 -3.091**
(1.958) (0.749) (2.161) (1.365)
Works hard 1.002 0.049 0.355 -1.303
(1.791) (1.117) (2.028) (1.704)
Experienced bullying 2.260 1.258 1.734 0.917
(1.752) (0.914) (1.940) (1.526)
Lives with both parents 0.821 0.129 1.066 0.434
(1.349) (0.868) (1.673) (1.441)
Works 0.065 -0.597 -0.316 -1.229
(0.863) (0.442) (1.182) (0.832)
Mother with college degree 1.077 0.669 0.786 3.551
(3.941) (2.301) (4.068) (4.390)
Father with college degree 5.745** -0.302 5.392** -1.969
(2.215) (1.294) (2.187) (2.045)
High SES (asset index) 1.376 0.015 1.066 -0.415
(1.276) (0.640) (1.319) (0.986)
Previous mock exam with feedback 2.560* -1.038 3.311** -1.612
(1.441) (0.817) (1.335) (0.990)
Number of Observations 710 710 710 710
R-squared 0.213 0.043 0.197 0.048
Number of Clusters 28 28 28 28
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors
clustered at the middle school level are reported in parenthesis. Sample of ninth graders in
schools that belong to the control group. All regressions include a dummy indicating one or
more covariates has missing data.
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Table 3: Subjective Expectations About Performance in the Admission Test
Sample All Placebo and Treatment Groups
Dependent Variable Mean Beliefs SD Beliefs |Mean Beliefs-Mock Score|
(1) (2) (3)
Exam Taking 0.441 1.184*
(1.359) (0.625)
Perform. Feedback -6.094*** -1.553**
(1.158) (0.664)
Perform. Feedback (vs. Exam Taking) -6.713***
(0.649)
Exam Taking= Feedback (P-value) 0.001 0.001
Mean Control/Placebo 75.72 17.26 18.72
Number of Observations 2825 2825 2115
R-squared 0.086 0.044 0.095
Number of Clusters 118 118 90
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at
the middle school level and they are reported in parenthesis. All specifications include a set of dummy variables which
corresponds to the randomization strata, pre-determined characteristics (whether or not both parents cohabit, parental
education, and an asset index), and an indicator variable for whether or not one or more covariates has missing data.
The dependent variable ‘Mean Beliefs’ is constructed as the summation of the mid-values in each discrete interval of the
score multiplied by the associated probability assigned by the student. The dependent variable ‘SD Beliefs’ is obtained
as the square root of the summation of the square of the mid-value in each discrete interval of the score multiplied by
the associated probability minus the square of mean beliefs. The dependent variable ‘|Mean Beliefs-Mock Score|’ is
constructed as the absolute value of the difference between mean beliefs and the score in the mock exam. The sample of
Columns 1 and 2 is comprised of ninth graders in schools from the treatment group, the placebo group and the control
group. The sample in Columns 3 is comprised of ninth graders from the treatment and placebo groups.
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Table 4: Curricular Track
Sample Control Group Placebo and Treatment Groups
Dependent Variable Share Assigned Share Assigned
Academic Academic Academic Academic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Beliefs (z-score) 0.043*** 0.041**
(0.013) (0.018)
Exam Score (z-score) 0.023 0.046
(0.014) (0.028)
GPA (z-score) 0.045*** 0.076***
(0.013) (0.021)
Performance Feedback (vs. Exam Taking) 0.004 -0.043
(0.019) (0.029)
Performance Feedback×Mock Score 0.035** 0.048*
(0.013) (0.025)
Mock Score (z-score) 0.032*** 0.082***
(0.010) (0.021)
Exam Score= Mean Beliefs (P-value) 0.371 0.883
Mean Control/Placebo 0.62 0.52 0.63 0.55
Number of Observations 710 710 2115 2115
R-squared 0.117 0.080 0.104 0.081
Number of Clusters 28 28 90 90
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the
middle school level are reported in parenthesis. All specifications include a set of dummy variables which corresponds
to the randomization strata, pre-determined characteristics (whether or not both parents cohabit, parental education, and
an asset index), and an indicator variable for whether or not one or more covariates has missing data. The dependent
variable ‘Share Academic’ denotes the share of high school programs in the school rankings submitted by each applicants
that belong to the curricular modality of the General Track or are sponsored by the National Polytechnic Institute. The
dependent variable ‘Assign Academic’ denotes an indicator variable that is equal to one if the applicant is assigned
through the centralized mechanism to one high school program that belong to the curricular modality of the General
Track or is sponsored by the National Polytechnic Institute and zero otherwise. The sample of Columns 1 and 2 is
comprised of ninth graders in schools from the control group. The sample in Columns 3 and 4 is comprised of ninth
graders from the treatment and placebo groups.
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Table 5: School Selectivity
Sample Control Group Placebo and Treatment Groups
Dependent Variable Share Assigned Share Assigned
Selective Selective Selective Selective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Beliefs (z-score) 0.027** 0.026
(0.010) (0.017)
Exam Score (z-score) 0.061*** 0.239***
(0.014) (0.021)
GPA (z-score) 0.033** 0.012
(0.013) (0.023)
Performance Feedback (vs. Exam Taking) 0.001 -0.012
(0.017) (0.027)
Performance Feedback×Mock Score 0.007 0.012
(0.009) (0.021)
Mock Score (z-score) 0.056*** 0.192***
(0.006) (0.017)
Exam Score= Mean Beliefs (P-value) 0.066 0.001
Mean Control/Placebo 0.66 0.55 0.77 0.66
Number of Observations 710 710 2115 2115
R-squared 0.221 0.298 0.337 0.287
Number of Clusters 28 28 90 90
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered
at the middle school level are reported in parenthesis. All specifications include a set of dummy variables which
corresponds to the randomization strata, pre-determined characteristics (whether or not both parents cohabit, parental
education, and an asset index), and an indicator variable for whether or not one or more covariates has missing data.
The dependent variable ‘Share Select’ denotes the share of high school programs in the school rankings submitted by
each applicants with cut-off score from the previous round of the assignment mechanisms (2013) that is above the
median of cut-off scores in the sample. The dependent variable ‘Assign Select’ denotes an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the applicant is assigned through the centralized mechanism to one high school program with cut-off
score that is above the median of cut-off scores in the sample and zero otherwise. The sample of Columns 1 and 2 is
comprised of ninth graders in schools from the control group. The sample in Columns 3 and 4 is comprised of ninth
graders from the treatment and placebo groups.
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Table 6: High-School Trajectories
Dependent Variable Enrollment Graduation on Time
(1) (2) (3)
Exam Taking -0.012 0.046
(0.020) (0.030)
Performance Feedback -0.006 0.084***
(0.019) (0.029)
Exam Taking ×Quintile 1 of Exam Score 0.123**
(0.062)
Exam Taking×Quintile 2 of Exam Score 0.034
(0.059)
Exam Taking×Quintile 3 of Exam Score 0.011
(0.054)
Exam Taking×Quintile 4 of Exam Score 0.041
(0.062)
Exam Taking×Quintile 5 of Exam Score 0.007
(0.058)
Performance Feedback×Quintile 1 of Exam Score 0.199***
(0.061)
Performance Feedback×Quintile 2 of Exam Score 0.070
(0.060)
Performance Feedback×Quintile 3 of Exam Score -0.014
(0.056)
Performance Feedback×Quintile 4 of Exam Score 0.061
(0.066)
Performance Feedback×Quintile 5 of Exam Score 0.104**
(0.050)
Exam Taking= Performance Feedback (P-value) 0.709 0.105 0.220
Mean Control Group 0.81 0.56 0.56
Number of Observations 2824 2173 2173
R-squared 0.040 0.106 0.120
Number of Clusters 461 393 393
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates. Standard
errors clustered at the high school level are reported in parenthesis. All specifications include a set
of dummy variables that corresponds to the public institution sponsoring the high schools participating
in the centralized system, pre-determined characteristics (whether or not both parents cohabit, parental
education, and an asset index), and an indicator variable for whether or not one or more covariates has
missing data. The dependent variable ‘Enrollment’ denotes an indicator variable that is equal to one
if students enroll in the high-school programs they were assigned in the first round of the assignment
mechanism and zero otherwise. The dependent variable ‘Graduation on Time’ denotes an indicator
variable that is equal to one if the students successfully complete the high-school programs they enrolled
in and zero otherwise. The sample of Column 1 is comprised of the students in the treatment group, the
placebo group and the control group except for one student with missing high-school enrollment records
(see footnote 13 in the text). The sample of Columns 2 and 3 is comprised of the students in the treatment
group, the placebo group and the control group who enrolled in the high-school programs assigned to
them through the centralized assignment mechanism except for 172 students with missing high-school
graduation records (see footnote 13 in the text).
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates of Logit Models with Control Function Adjustment
(1) (2)
Ranked-Order Logit Conditional Logit
Coefficients based on Perceived Ability:
µ× Academic Track 0.0430*** 0.0400***
(0.0083) (0.0138)
σ× Academic Track -0.1025*** -0.0871**
(0.0251) (0.0437)
µ× Selective School 0.0316*** 0.0344**
(0.0088) (0.0151)
σ× Selective School -0.0769*** -0.0442
(0.0214) (0.0396)
Coefficients for School Characteristics:
Academic Track -0.8156 -1.0343
(0.5465) (0.8504)
Selective School -0.2568 -0.8249
(0.5358) (1.0168)
Other Coefficients:
Distance (km) -0.2168*** -0.2612***
(0.0061) (0.0098)
Both Parents×Distance -0.0046 -0.0020
(0.0052) (0.0100)
Parent with College×Distance 0.0159** 0.0164
(0.0074) (0.0132)
Above Median SE Index ×Distance 0.0257*** 0.0311***
(0.0046) (0.0088)
Number of Observations 1663925 1329441
Log Likelihood at Convergence -124434.5 -10920.95
H0: Students are weakly truth telling (p-value)† 0.00001
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates obtained by maximum
likelihood. Standard errors calculated with 50 bootstrap replications are reported in parenthesis. The sample
of Column 2 is comprised of student-school observations with feasible choice sets. Both specifications
school-institution fixed effects and the residuals of individual beliefs interacted with the indicator functions
for the academic track and above-median cut-off score.
†Estimates of Column 2 are consistent under H0 and Ha. Estimates of Column 2 are inconsistent under Ha
and efficient under Ho. If the model is correctly specified and the matching is stable, the rejection of the null
hypothesis implies that (weak) truth-telling is violated in the data.
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates of Random Coefficients Logit Models
(1) (2)
Without With
Control Function Control Function
Coefficients based on Perceived Ability:
µ× Academic Track 0.0149*** 0.0667***
(0.0045) (0.0207)
σ× Academic Track 0.0009 -0.1289**
(0.0079) (0.0629)
µ× Selective School 0.0180*** 0.0325*
(0.0036) (0.0169)
σ× Selective School -0.0012 -0.0425
(0.0062) (0.0504)
Random Coefficients for School Characteristics:
Academic Track (Mean) -0.4879 -2.3166*
(0.3728) (1.3247)
Academic Track (SD) 1.8441*** 1.8986**
(0.2277) (0.8172)
Selective School (Mean) -0.2209 -0.7522
(0.2895) (1.0602)
Selective School (SD) 0.0604 0.0536
(0.3013) (0.1356)
Other Coefficients:
Distance (Km) -0.2645*** -0.2668***
(0.0091) (0.0122)
Both Parents×Distance -0.0039 -0.0019
(0.0086) (0.0104)
Parent with College×Distance 0.0166 0.0157
(0.0107) (0.0130)
Above-median SE Index×Distance 0.0315*** 0.0334***
(0.0076) (0.0089)
Number of Observations 1329441 1329441
Log Likelihood at Convergence -10906 -10900
F-Test of Control Function Terms (P-value) 0.08891
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates obtained
by simulated maximum likelihood. Standard errors calculated with 50 bootstrap replications are
reported in parenthesis. Sample of student-school observations with feasible choice sets. Both
specifications include other individual characteristics interacted with distance as additional regres-
sors, as well as school-institution fixed effects. The specification in column 2 also includes OLS
residuals of students’ beliefs interacted with the indicator functions for the academic track and
above-median cut-off score. For a full list of the estimated coefficients in both models, see Table
B.6 in the Appendix. 45
Appendix
A Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Average Skipping Patterns in the Mock Exam
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Note: The x-axis orders the 128 questions of the exam in order of appearance. Different colors are used to group
together questions from the same section in the exam. Questions in red are the ones excluded from grading since the
school curriculum did not cover those subjects by the time of the application of the mock test.
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Figure A.2: Geographic Location of the Middle Schools in the Experiment
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Note: The thick black line denotes the geographic border between the Federal District and the State of Mexico. The
thin grey lines indicate the borders of the different neighborhoods (municipalities). The four geographic regions that,
together with the terciles of the distribution of school performance, determine the strata in the experimental design
(see Section 2.3) are shaded in different colors.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of Cut-off Scores
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Note: Cut-off scores for each high school program refer to the assignment process of the year 2014. Academic
schools are defined as those in the general track and those sponsored by the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN).
Source: COMIPEMS administrative data.
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B Additional Tables
Table B.1: Comparing Population and Sample
Sample All COMIPEMS Experiment
Statistic Mean SD Mean SD
Student Characteristics
Works 0.273 0.446 0.333 0.471
Indigenous ethnicity 0.041 0.199 0.098 0.297
Disabled status 0.113 0.317 0.145 0.352
Scholarship in Middle School 0.112 0.315 0.119 0.324
Grade retention in Middle School 0.134 0.340 0.123 0.329
Plans to go to college 0.808 0.394 0.717 0.451
GPA (middle school) 8.130 0.894 8.138 0.842
Lives with both parents 0.746 0.436 0.788 0.409
Mother with college degree 0.117 0.321 0.049 0.217
Father with college degree 0.189 0.391 0.101 0.301
Assignment Outcomes
Exam score 70.986 21.169 65.683 19.697
Academic Track 0.605 0.489 0.631 0.270
cut-off score for 2013 58.054 24.552 50.866 22.475
Distance from school of origin (Km) 7.052 6.267 9.540 4.814
Institution 1 0.161 0.367 0.107 0.309
Institution 2 0.351 0.477 0.532 0.499
Institution 3 0.175 0.380 0.158 0.364
Institution 4 0.004 0.061 0.011 0.103
Institution 5 0.089 0.284 0.061 0.239
Institution 6 0.007 0.085 0.002 0.050
Institution 7 0.143 0.350 0.075 0.264
Institution 8 0.070 0.256 0.055 0.227
Institution 9 0.001 0.033 0.000 0.019
High School Outcomes
Enrollment 0.850 0.357 0.822 0.383
Graduation on Time (3 years) 0.477 0.499 0.588 0.492
NOTE: The ’All COMIPEMS’ sample consists of all applicants in the year 2014 from
the Mexico City metropolitan area who were assigned through the matching algorithm
– i.e. the first round of the assignment process described in Section 2.1 (N=203,121).
The statistics reported for high school outcomes refer to the cohort of applicants in the
year 2006 for which comparable high school trajectories were constructed (N=184,816).
The ’Experiment’ sample consists of the sample students used throughout the empirical
analysis (N=2,825).
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Table B.2: Average Treatment Effects on Application and Admission Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Participates Placed in 1st Placed Length of Exam
in COMIPEMS Round Any Rankings Score
Exam Taking 0.004 0.006 0.017 -0.076 -0.473
(0.012) (0.022) (0.022) (0.343) (1.335)
Performance Feedback 0.005 0.002 0.009 -0.026 -0.149
(0.011) (0.023) (0.024) (0.344) (1.295)
Mean Control 0.88 0.88 0.90 9.55 64.07
Number of Observations 3644 3251 3251 2825 2825
R-squared 0.377 0.028 0.032 0.025 0.107
Number of Clusters 118 118 118 118 118
NOTE: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the middle school level are reported in parenthesis.
Sample of ninth graders in schools from the treatment group, the placebo group, and the control group.
All specifications include a set of dummy variables which corresponds to the randomization strata, pre-
determined characteristics (whether or not both parents cohabit, parental education, and asset index), and
an indicator variable for whether or not one or more covariates has missing data.
V
Table B.3: Subjective Expectations About Performance in the Admission Test – Alterna-
tive Measures for Location and Scale of the Individual Distributions
Dependent Variable Median IQR |Median-Mock Score|
(1) (2) (3)
Exam Taking 0.660 1.005
(1.418) (1.043)
Perform. Feedback -7.715*** -1.811*
(1.221) (0.985)
Perform. Feedback (vs. Exam Taking) -6.713***
(0.649)
Exam Taking= Feedback (P-value) 0.001 0.001
Mean Control/Placebo 78.95 23.98 18.72
Number of Observations 2825 2825 2115
R-squared 0.087 0.026 0.095
Number of Clusters 118 118 90
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates. Standard
errors clustered at the middle school level are reported in parenthesis. The sample of columns 1 and 2
is comprised of ninth graders in schools from the treatment group, the placebo group, and the control
group. The sample in column 3 is comprised of ninth graders from the treatment and placebo groups.
The median is defined as the midpoint of the interval in which the cumulative density of beans first
surpasses 0.5 (11 beans or more). The inter-quantile range (IQR) is defined as the difference between
the midpoints of the intervals that accumulate 75 percent and 25 percent of the probability mass. All
specifications include a set of dummy variables which corresponds to the randomization strata, pre-
determined characteristics (whether or not both parents cohabit, parental education, and asset index),
and an indicator variable for whether one or more covariates has missing data.
VI
Table B.4: Treatment Effects on Track Choices and Track Assignment – Alternative Achieve-
ment Measures
Sample Placebo and Treatment Groups
Dependent Variable Share Assigned Share Assigned
Academic Academic Academic Academic
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Performance Feedback (vs. Exam Taking) 0.007 -0.038 0.010 -0.031
(0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.028)
Performance Feedback×Exam Score 0.026* 0.050*
(0.013) (0.029)
Exam Score (z-score) 0.042*** 0.113***
(0.010) (0.024)
Performance Feedback×GPA 0.029** 0.066***
(0.012) (0.022)
GPA (z-score) 0.039*** 0.054***
(0.008) (0.014)
Mean Placebo 0.63 0.55 0.63 0.55
Number of Observations 2115 2115 2115 2115
R-squared 0.105 0.106 0.108 0.071
Number of Clusters 90 90 90 90
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates. Standard errors
clustered at the middle school level are reported in parenthesis. Sample of ninth graders in schools from
the treatment group, the placebo group, and the control group. All specifications include a set of dummy
variables which corresponds to the randomization strata, pre-determined characteristics (whether or not both
parents cohabit, parental education, and asset index), and an indicator variable for whether or not one or more
covariates has missing data.
VII
Table B.5: Estimates of the First Stage – Full Specification
(1) (2)
Mean Beliefs SD Beliefs
Exam Taking 0.306 1.274**
(1.351) (0.613)
Performance Feedback -5.899*** -1.552**
(1.122) (0.657)
Academic Track -0.002 0.009
(0.011) (0.006)
cut-off Score Above Median 2.335*** -0.391***
(0.136) (0.070)
Distance (km) 0.044** -0.006
(0.022) (0.010)
Both Parents×Distance -0.041** 0.006
(0.021) (0.010)
Parent with College×Distance -0.025 -0.014
(0.033) (0.015)
Above Median SE Index ×Distance -0.029 0.009
(0.020) (0.011)
Missing value ×Distance -0.029 -0.003
(0.026) (0.015)
Both Parents 2.060** -0.581
(0.911) (0.425)
Parent with College 4.893*** -0.077
(1.199) (0.612)
Above Median SE Index 3.039*** -1.052***
(0.891) (0.401)
Missing value 1.062 -0.543
(1.055) (0.651)
Institution 1 -1.120*** 0.154***
(0.098) (0.043)
Institution 2 -1.214*** 0.159***
(0.100) (0.043)
Institution 3 -1.361*** 0.200***
(0.097) (0.042)
Institution 4 1.605*** -0.134*
(0.172) (0.072)
Institution 5 5.855*** -0.352
(0.547) (0.247)
Institution 6 7.090*** -0.258
(0.619) (0.289)
Institution 7 -1.571*** 0.227***
(0.111) (0.048)
Institution 8 5.840*** -0.422
(0.613) (0.264)
Mean Placebo 75.49 15.71
Number of Observations 1329441 1329441
R-squared 0.096 0.048
Number of Clusters 118 118
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS
estimates. Standard errors clustered at the middle school level are reported in
parenthesis. Sample of student-school observations with feasible choice sets. All
specifications include a set of dummy variables which corresponds to the random-
ization strata.
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Table B.6: Estimates of Random Coefficients Logit Model – Full Specification
(1) (2)
Without Control Function With Control Function
µ× Academic Track 0.0149*** 0.0667***
(0.0045) (0.0207)
σ× Academic Track 0.0009 -0.1289**
(0.0079) (0.0629)
ξµ× Academic Track -0.0537***
(0.0202)
ξσ× Academic Track 0.1313**
(0.0624)
µ× Selective School 0.0180*** 0.0325*
(0.0036) (0.0169)
σ× Selective School -0.0012 -0.0425
(0.0062) (0.0504)
ξµ× Selective School -0.0152
(0.0169)
ξσ× Selective School 0.0419
(0.0502)
Academic Track (Mean) -0.4879 -2.3166*
(0.3728) (1.3247)
Academic Track (SD) 1.8441*** 1.8986**
(0.2277) (0.8172)
Selective School (Mean) -0.2209 -0.7522
(0.2895) (1.0602)
Selective School (SD) 0.0604 0.0536
(0.3013) (0.1356)
Distance (Km) -0.2645*** -0.2668***
(0.0091) (0.0122)
Both Parents×Distance -0.0039 -0.0019
(0.0086) (0.0104)
Parent with College×Distance 0.0166 0.0157
(0.0107) (0.0130)
Above Median SE Index×Distance 0.0315*** 0.0334***
(0.0076) (0.0089)
Missing value×Distance 0.0002 0.0009
(0.0111) (0.0152)
Institution 1 -1.7604*** -1.6120***
(0.0846) (0.0948)
Institution 2 -0.1266 0.0377
(0.1036) (0.1158)
Institution 3 0.4118* 0.5238**
(0.2139) (0.2122)
Institution 4 -0.3339 -0.4694
(0.3893) (0.4398)
Institution 5 3.2279*** 2.7541***
(0.1578) (0.2983)
Institution 6 4.4910*** 3.9477***
(0.1676) (0.3192)
Institution 7 -1.7527*** -1.6039***
(0.1266) (0.1338)
Institution 8 0.4983 0.0083
(1.0205) (14.0419)
Number of Observations 1329441 1329441
Log Likelihood at Convergence -10906 -10900
F-Test of Control Function Terms (P-value) 0.08891
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates obtained by simulated maximum
likelihood. Standard errors calculated with 50 bootstrap replications are reported in parenthesis. Sample of student-school
observations with feasible choice sets. IX
Table B.7: Parameter Estimates of Random Coefficients Logit Models – Alternative
Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Correlated Polynomial Median as µ
Random Coeffs. in CF terms and IQR as σ
Coefficients based on Perceived Ability:
µ× Academic Track 0.0594*** 0.0676*** 0.0481***
(0.0200) (0.0215) (0.0154)
σ× Academic Track -0.1144* -0.1280** -0.1070*
(0.0604) (0.0640) (0.0578)
µ× Selective School 0.0329** 0.0337** 0.0266*
(0.0154) (0.0165) (0.0138)
σ× Selective School -0.0433 -0.0400 -0.0502
(0.0400) (0.0529) (0.0450)
Random Coefficients:
Academic Track (Mean) -1.9911 -2.3883* -0.7225
(1.2754) (1.2952) (1.2361)
Academic Track (SD) 1.8663** -1.9119** 1.8837
(0.8116) (1.4437) (1.2466)
School Selectivity (Mean) -0.7510 -0.8203 0.0504
(1.0495) (0.9903) (0.9512)
School Selectivity (SD) 0.0559 0.0505 0.0557
(0.1389) (0.1335) (0.1717)
Cov(Academic,Selectivity) 0.0828
(0.1022)
Other Coefficients:
Distance - Km -0.2666*** -0.2667*** -0.2664***
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Above Median SE Index×Distance 0.0332*** 0.0334*** 0.0328***
(0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0091)
Number of Observations 1329441 1329441 1329441
F-Test of Control Function Terms (p-value) 0.1804 0.3517 0.1783
NOTE: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates obtained by
simulated maximum likelihood. Standard errors calculated with 50 bootstrap replications are reported
in parenthesis. Sample of student-school observations with feasible choice sets. All specifications
include other individual characteristics interacted with distance, school-institution fixed effects, and
OLS residuals of students’ beliefs interacted with the indicator functions for the academic track and
above-median cut-off score (not reported). The specification in Column 2 further includes the square
terms of the OLS residuals of the first step and their interaction terms, all interacted with the indicator
functions for the academic track and above-median cut-off score (not reported). The specification in
column 3 includes the median and the Inter-Quantile Range (IQR) of the individual belief distributions
as alternative measures for the location and the scale parameters.
X
